duel, theorists, moderation, civil conduct, Italianate, courtesy, England, honour
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43
It is reputed so great a shame to be accounted a lyer, that any other iniury is cancelled by giuing the lie; and he that receiueth it, standeth so charged in his honor and reputation, that he cannot disburden himself of that imputation, but by striking of him that hath so giuen it, or by chalenging him the combat. (pp.64-5)
Following the duel theorists, Bryskett claims that the only honourable and practical response to traducement is counter-attack. Moderation might be an admirable quality but “striking back” is the only sure way to “disburden” oneself of the stigma of being defamed.
77
At this point Bryskett’s interlocutor becomes understandably confused as to whether such a reaction “concerne[s] honor or no? and whether it appertaine to ciuill life, and that felicitie which we are discoursing vpon or no?” (p.65). Civility and utilitarian defences of one’s reputation appear particularly difficult to reconcile upon this matter.
In some respects, this analysis glosses over changing trends in the theory of civil conduct between the time of Elyot and Bryskett. Elyot is writing before the rise of Italianate courtesy in England and the concomitant heightening of sensitivity towards reputation which, for gentlemen and courtiers, made resorting to bloodshed to defend their honour increasingly obligatory. Bryskett, in contrast, is writing in the midst of this culture. However, what the conduct books and duel manuals agree upon consistently throughout this period is that a gentleman ought to refrain from answering discourtesy with discourtesy even when combat is unavoidable.
78
77 John Dryden perceived a similar dilemma in the late-seventeenth century in his Discourse Concerning Satire. He argues that responding in kind ought to be a last resort when recourse to law or other remedies are unavailable, and even in such circumstances he is reluctant to give this his full approval:
We have no moral right on the reputation of other men, ’Tis taking from them what we cannot restore to them. There are only two reasons for which we may be permitted to write lampoons; and I will not promise that they can always justify us. The first is revenge, when we have been affronted in the same nature, or have been any ways notoriously abused, and can make ourselves no other reparation. (Watson ed. (1968), pp.125-6)
78 Peltonen (2003), p.48 and p.73.
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