palinodes, tautologically, Googe, Aristotelian, friendship, Alexander Neville, allies, Blundeston, Petrarchan excess
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corrective palinodes, while ones concurring with his intertexts might be responded to tautologically. It is a straightforward principle and theoretically its orchestration is unproblematic. This regulating principle, however, necessitates some degree of deferral to his friends on Googe’s part. Not only must he allow them to correct him when he affects an unethical outlook, he also risks being surpassed stylistically and rhetorically by tautologous answers to his verse. As such, his poetic game is one that requires and expresses trust, and that depends upon faithfulness and solidarity within the group in order to work. Arguably, it also operates within the Aristotelian principle that the good man shows his nobility by sacrificing self-interest in favour of his friends.
331 The effect is, of course, highly artificial and contrived, and Googe, or Blundeston in his editorial role, would have no real reason to expect, or for that matter include, unpalatable or unfitting responses. In fact, Googe’s display of deferral to his familiar correspondents perhaps suggests his awareness that he can promote his good name by following the Aristotelian model of deferential friendship. Here then, the ethos of dialogic friendship functions to maintain, consolidate or improve reputation through self-effacement just as, inversely, in the culture of reflexive slander, self-promoting attack is used to defend reputation. It is significant, moreover, that when Googe exposes himself to hostile responses through publication, he presents a broad front by putting his allies on display as well.
One tautologous exchange begins with Googe’s ‘To Alexander Neville’ in which he assumes the role of a counselor, advising his cousin how Petrarchan excess might be avoided. Predictably, Neville responds with a poem endorsing his argument. In his answer
Aristotelianism’, HSc, 11 (1973), pp.159-93 (p.163).
331 Or, alternately, it might demonstrate that for the good man there is no distinction between his self-interest and the interests of his friends. On this point see Sandra Lynch, ‘Aristotle and Derrida on Friendship’, Co, 3 (2002), 98-108 (pp.98-100), <www.usyd.edu.au/contretemps/
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